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Abstract
This paper proposes a metric for a financial fragility index for the Chinese banking
sector. This metric is a weighted average of two variables: bank profitability and mul-
tiple probability of undercapitalization. The weights of the two variables are assigned
based on their effects on real output, estimated by a vector autoregressive model. The
main contribution is two-fold: incorporating a capital adequacy ratio into a quantitative
measure and aggregating insolvency risk through a multiple probability measure. We
confirm that our metric successfully identifies three periods of financial turmoil accom-
panied by economic downturns and rules out one minor perturbation caused by side
effect of the policy between 2007 and 2014. In particular, this study provides an eco-
nomic rationale for the relationship among financial instability, policy, and economic
activity.
Keywords: Chinese economy, financial fragility, insolvency risk
JEL Classification: E30, E44, G18, G28
1 Introduction
The global financial crisis that began in the US and led to a downturn in advanced and de-
veloping economies highlighted the importance of understanding financial fragility. An es-
sential concern is how financial instability affects macroeconomic activity and produces real
economic costs. Thus policy makers, such as central banks, start to go beyond maintaining
price stability and make an effort to reduce the economic consequences of financial fragility.
This paper aims to propose a measure for financial fragility in the Chinese banking sector.
China is the world’s second largest economy, and since projections made in 2014 it may sur-
pass the US as the world’s largest based on estimates by the IMF (2014 and 2015). In particu-
lar, the impact of China’s growing influence in addressing the global financial crisis cannot be
overlooked (Overholt, 2010). While China maintained growth above international averages,
its growth rate was substantially lowered by the crisis (Li et al., 2012). Indeed, the Chinese
financial system has been relatively fragile, as brought to light by several episodes of financial
turmoil such as the global financial crisis, European sovereign debt crisis, real estate crash,
and cash crunch since 2007. Further, the recent stock market crash is noteworthy in that it
not only resulted in decreased purchasing power but also heightened instability in the entire
financial market and the contingent financial contagion across global markets. Thus it is im-
portant to look for an appropriate metric to capture the feature of financial fragility for the
Chinese banking sector, which has dominated the entire financial system as themain resource
for funding firms’ growth (Allen et al., 2012b).
Many studies indicate that there is no general consensus on the definition of financial sta-
bility. Crockett (1997) noted that financial stability requires key institutions and key markets
to be stable. Mishkin (1994) explained that financial instability occurs when shocks to the
financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system can no longer
do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities. Haldane
et al. (2004) have stated that financial instability is any deviation from the optimal saving-
investment plan of the economy that is due to imperfections in the financial sector. Issing
(2003) and Foot (2003) have said that financial instability is linked to financial market bubbles,
or more generally, volatility in financial markets. Further, none of these studies appropriately
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defines a measure to analyze financial stability. Cevik et al. (2013) and Illing and Liu (2006)
conducted a general survey and mention that financial stability indices typically aggregate
some variables, indicating different author-defined risks, (e.g. if values of these variables de-
teriorate within a certain period, then financial instability arises). However, there should be
more of an economic rationale than a natural conclusion supported by economic theory; a
cogent measure should be based on theory.
Thus, we follow the definition of financial instability provided by Tsomocos (2003a and b),
where financial fragility is characterized by reduced bank profitability and increased insol-
vency risk. To put it differently, whenever bank insolvency risk increases and bank prof-
itability decreases, i.e. when the economy is financially more fragile, real output falls, which
is based on simulations and calibrations of the model developed in Goodhart et al. (2005 and
2006).1 We follow Aspachs et al. (2006) and Lee et al. (2013) to use a weighted two-factor
model to compose a financial fragility index (FIX) for China. We then use a vector autore-
gressive (VAR) model to determine the weights assigned to these two variables based on
their effect on real output.
We extend Aspachs et al. (2006) and Lee et al. (2013) by incorporating the capital adequacy
ratio (CAR) into a quantitative measure for FIX. This modification is essential for the analysis
of the insolvency risk of banks (Chan-Lau and Sy, 2007). First, the financial regulator imposes
pre-default interventions on banks once they become undercapitalized. Therefore, in the
view of regulators, the probability of undercapitalization (PoU), which measures the risk that
banks fail to meet a CAR and consequently trigger pre-default actions, is more relevant than
probability of default (PoD). Second, the theoretical study (Tsomocos, 2003a and b) on which
we based the FIX construct takes CAR into consideration, as well. Thus, we substitute PoU
for PoD as one of the components of our FIX. We calculate PoU following Chan-Lau and Sy
(2007).
It is challenging to consider the Chinese banking sector typically because it is mainly domi-
1The theoretical modeling in Goodhart et al. (2005 and 2006) illuminates problems relating to individ-
ual bank behavior, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the capital adequacy
ratio. Financial instability emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon in their model. The effects
of shocks on the stability of the overall banking system can reasonably be represented by two factors, i.e.
bank profitability and default probability of the banking sector.
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nated by a few large commercial banks. Five banks held approximately 43-55 percent of the
total assets of the entire banking sector from 2007 to 2013, according to the China Banking
Regulatory Commission (CBRC, 2013). Consequently, we question the previous literature’s
use of a joint aggregation scheme for banks’ insolvency risk, i.e. the probability that all banks
fall into default. This underestimates the systemic insolvency risk, especially when only a
few banks, which dominate the whole banking sector, fail. Thus instead of the joint aggrega-
tion method, we use a multiple probability measure —the probability that at least one bank
will fail— to analyze financial fragility in China.
Using FIX, we analyze the mechanism through which financial instability affects economic
cycles. Many people are under the impression that China did not experience serious financial
damage during the global financial crisis or European sovereign debt crisis, because China
was not seriously engaged in subprime mortgages and had limited exposure to European
banks. However, we find that, indeed, China went through financial instability in these pe-
riods. This study provides an analysis of how the financial instability spreads from the ad-
vanced economies to China. In addition to these two worldwide episodes, another event of
turmoil in China, called a cash crunch, had a huge impact on the Chinese financial market.
All of the above events are captured by our FIX, and we provide the channels through which
financial fragility is linked to economic activity.
To limit the financial instability and banking crisis, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) imple-
mented a series of macroeconomic policies over the past few years. Our results show that in
the short term, the policy worked well in terms of stabilizing the economy, whereas it was
questionable in the long term. A discussion about the effects of policy on the real economy
and financial fragility is provided, as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the components of FIX and
the aggregation method. Section 3 reports the data and empirical results. Section 4 discusses
the relationship among financial fragility, economic activity and macroeconomic policy, and
Section 5 concludes.
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2 Construction of the financial fragility index
2.1 Selecting variables
According to our definition of financial fragility, we need to choose variables that would
give a good measure of banking profitability and insolvency risk. The possible proxies for
these two variables might be taken from balance sheet accounts, e.g. net income and non-
performing loans. But these accounting data do not work well possibly due to the existence
of accounting manipulation and the long delays between the current effect of events on banks
and their appearance in the accounts (Aspachs et al., 2006). Thus, we switch from an account-
ing measure to a market measure.
We use the annual percentage change in the China Mainland Banks Index (CMI) as a proxy
for bank profitability, named Equity; this index reflects the performance of 16 listed banks in
China. As the 16 banks’ aggregate share of the total assets of banking institutions is within the
range of 0.60-0.66 from 2003 to 2013 (CBRC, 2013), the performance can adequately represent
the profitability of the Chinese banking sector. Table 1 lists the names of the banks and the
beginning of the data period, as well as the rank in terms of total assets.2,3
Equityt =
CMIt   CMIt 12
CMIt
<Insert Table 1 here>
There are two steps to calculate the insolvency risk of the Chinese banking sector, i.e. multiple
probability of undercapitalization (MPoU). First, we calculate PoU based on themethodology
of Chan-Lau and Sy (2007). They modify Merton’s (1974) model, which can measure corpo-
rate insolvency risk, to create a proper framework of insolvency risk for banks. Second, we
2The banking institutions analyzed by CBRC (2013) include policy banks, the China Development
Bank, large commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks, rural commercial
banks, rural cooperative banks, urban credit cooperatives, rural credit cooperatives, non-bank financial
institutions, foreign banks, new-type rural financial institutions, and the Postal Savings Bank.
3All 16 banks can be traded in mainland China and nine of them in Hong Kong, as well. Chongqing
Rural Commercial Bank (CQRCB) is traded only inHongKong. CMI does not include CQRCB as CQRCB’s
share of the total assets of banking institutions is no more than 0.34 percent from 2008 to 2013.
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aggregate PoU of banks with multiple probability measure following Cathcart and El-Jahel
(2004).
PoU has a similar theoretical framework to PoD derived from Merton’s model. The value
of assets is assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion. The value of equity can be
considered a call option on the value of assets, with the strike price equal to the face value of
the liability. At the maturity of liability, if the value of the assets is less than the value of the
liability, the bank will default. The PoD is defined as follows:
PoD = Pr(V < L) = N( DD)
DD =
ln
 V
L
 
+
 
µ  12s2V
 
T
sV
p
T
where N (·) stands for the cumulative normal distribution function and DD is the distance to
default, V is the market value of the bank’s assets, L is the debt level of the bank with time to
maturity T, µ is the continuously compounded expected return on V and sV is the volatility
of the bank’s assets.
PoD is widely used for corporate distress measure. However, it may understate the risk
of bank interventions and bank closures prompted by regulators when banks cannot fulfill
certain requirements, in particular maintaining CAR. Based onMerton’s framework, in order
to incorporate the effect of CAR, DD can bemodified into distance to capital (DC). As a result,
PoU would be a better measurement of banks’ insolvency risk. The PoU can be written as
follows:
PoU = Pr(V   L < CAR ·V) = N( DC)
DC =
ln
  V
lL
 
+
 
µ  12s2V
 
T
sV
p
T
DD  DC = ln (l)
sV
p
T
(1)
l is a correction factor for DC,where l = 11 CAR . CAR is the capital adequacy ratio threshold
set by the supervisory authority. The most commonly used CAR is the statutory minimum
capital adequacy ratio.4
4On June 7, 2012, CBRC issued administrative measures for the capital of commercial banks. The
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In order to calculate MPoU, the financial contagion is modeled following Cathcart and El-
Jahel (2004), in which asset correlation is taken into consideration, as well as Acharya (2009),
Allen et al. (2012a) and Gornall and Strebulaev (2013). As Allen et al. (2012a) point out, asset
commonality is a source of systemic insolvency risk. Upon borrowing, banks invest in risky
and safe assets. In addition, they choose the industry in which they undertake risky invest-
ments. Although diversification reduces the individual default probabilities, it can lead to
greater systemic insolvency risk as banks’ investments become increasingly similar (Wagner,
2010; Ibragimov et al., 2011). Since banks’ assets are opaque (Morgan, 2002; Flannery et al.,
2013), the market receives information on the banking sector’s overall solvency rather than
on the precise value of banks’ asset fundamental values, which leads to information conta-
gion among financial institutions. The extent of contagion depends on the composition of the
asset structure, that is, on the degree of overlap of banks’ portfolios.
The aggregation methodology through asset correlation proposed by Cathcart and El-Jahel
(2004) is as follows:5
MPoU (1[ · · · [ n) = Âni=1 PoU (i) Âi 6=j PoU (i \ j) +
· · ·+ ( 1)n 1 PoU (1\ · · · \ n)
PoU (1\ · · · \ k) = Nk
  DC1, · · · , DCk; ri,j 
where k is the number of banks, Nk (·) stands for the k-dimensional cumulative normal
distribution function, and ri,j is the asset correlation between bank i and bank j.
2.2 Aggregation of variables
Financial instability matters in that it impairs the real economy in such a way that output and
general welfare suffer materially (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000; ECB, 2009). Thus, financial
fragility, measured as values of bank profitability and insolvency risk, would have an impact
on real output proxied by industrial production index (IPI).6 In this paper FIX is a weighted-
capital measures came into force on 1 January 2013. Commercial banks are required to have minimum
capital adequacy ratios of 8 percent.
5See the detailed calculation method in Appendix A.
6IPI is a measure of aggregate output (Fama, 1981; Chen et al., 1986). There are monthly data for IPI,
but not for GDP (only quarterly). Due to sample size, IPI is used instead of GDP.
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sum metric of these variables. The weights are assigned based on their effects on real output.
We investigate their relationship with output using a VAR model following Aspachs et al.
(2007) and Lee et al. (2013). The model can be specified as follows:
Xt = F1Xt 1 + . . .+FpXt p + et
where Xt represents a 3-dimensional vector (IPIt, Equityt,MPoUt)0.
To measure the effects of Equity and MPoU on IPI, we then derive the weights of two indica-
tors through variance decomposition. The FIX is defined as follows:
FIX = wA ⇤MPoU   wB ⇤ [Equity0 + av(MPoUt)  av(Equity0)] (2)
where Equity0 is the transformed equity growth rate series which has the same mean abso-
lute value and standard deviation as MPoU. av(MPoU) denotes the average of MPoU and
av(Equity0) denotes the average of Equity0.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
We construct a monthly FIX for November 2007 through April 2014. Data on the China Main-
land Banks Index (CMI), number of shares (N), equity price (P), debt level of banks (D),
risk-free rate (R) and real interest rate (RIR) are taken from the Wind database. In addition,
IPI, consumer price index (CPI) and property prices (PRP) are obtained from the National
Bureau of Statistics of China. The sample size is limited by the availability for N and P. This
limitation, however, does not prevent us from investigating financially fragile periods, which
rarely happened before our sample period. A description of the variables is given in Table 2
and in Appendix B.
<Insert Table 2 here>
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3.2 Components of FIX
First of all, we calculated MPoU and Equity in Figure 1(a) and (b), along with MPoD as a
comparison with MPoU. MPoD stays high before 2009 and keeps decaying later on, even
when the Chinese economy suffered recessions. They responded actively to the global finan-
cial crisis (end-2007 to mid-2009) during which period China’s annual growth of real GDP
fell from 14.2% in 2007 to 9.6% in 2008. There was a sharp fall in the stock market in 2007
and 2008, and exposure of Chinese banks to subprime-related assets was estimated to be up
to 3.7% of their total assets (Sun and Zhang, 2009). This finding is in line with Milne (2014),
who analyzed DD for the 41 largest global banking institutions and found that DD fell from
end-2006 through to end-2008, andHarada et al. (2013), who examined the movements of DD
of eight failed Japanese banks and found that DD became smaller in anticipation of failure in
many cases.
However, MPoD does not responsively capture the downturn of the European sovereign
debt crisis in 2011 and the cash crunch in 2013 that caused a mounted risk for the banking
sector. This observation might be due to the fact that Merton’s model needs large enough
implied volatility to generate thick tail distribution ofV(T) to capture the growing risk, while
the implied volatilities of assets are dragged down by the decreasing equity volatilities of
banks over time. Both MPoD and MPoU indicate a high systemic insolvency risk in the first
recession. However, only MPoU captures the dynamics of Chinese economic episodes in the
second recession, demonstrating the significance of the incorporation of CAR in FIX.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
To illustrate the effect of CAR, we took the differences between DD and DC, i.e. DD - DC, for
16 banks in Figure 2 which are the components ofMPoD andMPoU. If DC is close to DD, then
the regulatory action has limited influence on lowering banks’ insolvency risk. The larger the
difference between DD and DC, the stronger effect the regulatory action has on controlling
insolvency risk in each bank. Since the measure of DC is supposed to correct the understated
likelihood of regulations prior to default, unsurprisingly, DD - DC is always positive. The
dynamics of DD - DC are the mirror image of the asset volatility according to equation (1):
the lower the asset volatility, the higher DD - DC.
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<Insert Figure 2 here>
In a tranquil period, low asset volatility enables banks to take on high debt safely, leading
to credit expansion, which is one of the sources of insolvency risk (Gornall and Strebulaev,
2013). This is the timewhen CAR, supposed to reduce bank insolvency risk, is more necessary
and is more effective in intervening in a bank’s lending behavior. Chan-Lau and Sy’s frame-
work (2007) refers to this negative correlation between asset volatility and the effectiveness
of CAR, which is proxied by DD - DC. Similarly, bank leverage decreases with high volatility.
This behavior is well documented in capital structure literature both theoretically and empir-
ically (Leland, 1994; Adrian and Shin, 2010). As loan portfolios become more volatile, banks
decrease their leverage to protect themselves against default (Gornall and Strebulaev, 2013).
Banks execute credit contraction and stick to maintaining CAR on their own initiative, not to
passively meet CAR. Thus, the role of regulatory actions seems to be reduced, resulting in the
lower DD - DC.
Further, we can see that there are similar systematic patterns for the 16 banks in the dynamics
of asset volatility and DD - DC, which is mainly driven by equity volatility.7 Chen et al. (2012)
divide the asset volatility in Merton’s model into systematic and idiosyncratic asset volatil-
ities. As we can see from Figure 2, in the last quarter of 2008, there was an obvious regime
shift, with an increasing asset volatility for most banks. There was another regime shift, with
a decreasing asset volatility in the third quarter of 2009. These two time periods correspond
to two important monetary policy adjustments in China.8 This finding is also in line with
Zhang et al. (2011), which captures the nature of China’s stock market volatility in the period
7However, Ping An Bank, one of the 16 banks, had an opposite trend to that of the other 15 banks
between January 2013 and April 2014. It experienced an upward trend during that time period. In 2013,
the price of gold in the global market was extremely volatile, with a downswing. Ping An Bank pursued
an aggressive gold investment in 2013. The annual report of Ping An Bank shows that by the end of
December 2013, the gold assets had achieved RMB 21.28 billion, with a 776 percent growth rate from 2012
(RMB 2.43 billion). This resulted in higher asset volatility in 2013.
8In order to alleviate the negative impact of the financial crisis, from September to December 2008, the
PBoC lowered the benchmark interest rates on deposits and loans five times and the reserve requirement
ratio four times, which led to extraordinary growth in domestic credit and money supply. Faced with
continuously rising inflation and a real estate bubble, the PBoC issued 1.3 trillion yuan worth of central
bank bills and sold 870 billion repurchase agreements in open market operations in the third quarter of
2009. At the end of 2009, the net withdrawal of currency from circulation reached up 0.5 trillion yuan. The
PBoC began to tighten the monetary policy in January 2010 and raised the required reserve ratio 12 times
by June 2011 (Source: PBoC, 2009a, 2009d, 2010a-d and 2011a-b).
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of 2003-2009 with the Marrkov regime switching to a GARCH model.9 The loose monetary
policy, to a large extent, lowered the real cost of investment and encouraged investors with
a preference for high risk investments to invest in capital assets and to add more risks to the
market. This was followed by monetary policy concerns about the credit expansion and the
credit risk underneath. Given the reduction of lendable funds in the banking sector, risk pre-
vention awareness has been enhanced, and loans were examinedmore carefully, thus making
the asset less volatile (Chen, 2012).
3.3 VAR
As mentioned, to compose the FIX, we measure the impact of Equity and MPoU on real out-
put. We use the VAR methodology, which treats all the variables as endogenous, to estimate
the weights of two variables by variance decomposition of the VAR model. Our baseline
model is {IPI, Equity, MPoU}. IPI is the annual growth rate of real IPI, and Equity is the
annual growth rate of the bank equity index. MPoU is the measure of the banking sector’s
insolvency risk. The optimal lags are selected by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).
Before we estimate the VAR model, we investigate whether variables are stationary or not.
We conduct the unit root tests, i.e. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP),
as in Table 3. Both ADF and PP tests consistently show that we reject the null hypothesis (the
variable has a unit root) for IPI and cannot reject for Equity at 5 percent significance level.
Yet these two tests provide conflicting results for MPoU, i.e. the null hypothesis is rejected
for MPoU by PP but not by ADF test at 5 percent significance level. After taking first-order
difference for the three variables, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 percent significance level
for all three variables. However, the results of conventional ADF and PP tests are dubious due
to ignoring the possible structural breaks of variables, which may lead to a bias that fails to
reject a false unit root null hypothesis. Therefore, we re-examine the nonstationarity of Equity
andMPoU using one-break unit root tests as in Table 3, which allows for additive outlier (AO)
scheme and the innovational outlier (IO) scheme proposed by Perron and Vogelsang (1992).10
9Equity volatility is a common proxy for asset volatility (Beaton, 2010; Wagner, 2012), which is also
implied by the equation (5).
10AO scheme allows for a sudden change in mean while IO scheme is for more gradual changes.
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The results show that we can reject the unit root null hypothesis for these two variables at the
5 percent significance level as well.
<Insert Table 3 here>
Given that IPI, Equity and MPoU are stationary, we derive the weights of two indicators by
variance decomposition of the VAR model.11 The ordering of variables is IPI, Equity, and
MPoU, determined by the variables’ degrees of linkage to external factors. Table 4 shows
the responses of one standard deviation shock to the other variables. The results show that
a positive shock to MPoU or a negative shock to Equity has a negative impact on IPI. These
results support our metric of a FIX with MPoU and Equity, along with the signs assigned to
them (Aspachs et al., 2006 and 2007; Lee et al., 2013).
<Insert Table 4 here>
We check the robustness of the baseline model’s result by adding more variables to the VAR
model: RIR, CPI and PRP. These variables are representative macroeconomic variables that
may have significant effects on output (Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Rudebusch, 2005).
Therefore, we conduct estimations with the models {IPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU}, {IPI, CPI, RIR,
Equity, MPoU} and {IPI, PRP, CPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU}. The results of these models show that
the direction and significance of the responses of IPI to Equity and MPoU remain as shown
in Table 4.
We use a two-year average of the impact in the variance decomposition in Table 5 to estimate
the weights of two factors. Based on a two-year average value of variance decomposition,
Equity explains 14.8% of the variation of IPI, while MPoU of the banking sector explains
6.1%. Hence, we assign the weight of Equity as 0.71 [14.8/(14.8+6.1)] and that of MPoU as
0.29 [6.1/(14.8+6.1)]. As the weight of Equity is higher than that of MPoU, we consider bank
profitability a more significant variable than MPoU, which contrasts with the conclusion of
Lee et al. (2013) in relation to the case of Korea.
<Insert Table 5 here>
11The result of VAR shows that our model is stable and the impulse response functions do not explode,
which satisfies our purpose of using VAR, i.e. to investigate the impact of Equity and MPoU on real
output.
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The robustness results show that the relative weights of Equity and MPoU are 0.62-0.78 and
0.22-0.38, respectively. Our baseline model shows that the weights fall in these intervals,
which means the baseline model predictions are reasonable. In addition, we change the or-
dering of variables in the baseline model and confirm that the weights of Equity and MPoU
vary within 0.71-0.77 and 0.23-0.29, which indicates the weights of two variables are not sen-
sitive to the ordering.
3.4 Financial fragility index
According to the metric of FIX in equation (2), with weights of Equity (0.71) andMPoU (0.29),
we compose FIX as reported in Figure 3. The increase in the value of FIX indicates the insta-
bility of the banking sector. Following Cardarelli et al. (2011), we identify the episodes of
financial fragility as those periods when FIX is more than one standard deviation above its
trend estimated by Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. During our sample periods, three episodes
are identified as financial fragility: (1) global financial crisis, (2) European sovereign debt cri-
sis, and (3) cash crunch in China. All of them capture the recessions that echo the character
of FIX, i.e. the financial instability impairs real output.
<Insert Figure 3 here>
Other than these three cases, the real estate crash in 2010 was broadly perceived as a turmoil
event in China. However, the value of FIX during that time is below the threshold. In fact,
the crash was a consequence of strict government control of real estate policy as a precaution
against a serious crisis due to the real estate market, such as the Asian financial crisis and
the US subprime mortgage crisis. In other words, the real estate crash does not correlate to
economic downturn. Instead, it results from precautionary policy intervention for potential
financial instability. Overall, our FIX is a good indicator in the sense that it not only captures
the fragile financial events but also correctly measures the degree of instability which can be
overestimated.
The reason FIX works well as a measurement of financial fragility is that the two components
of FIX, i.e. Equity andMPoU, characterize the effects of shocks on the financial system. These
two factors reveal the real economic activity. In the following section we will provide an
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analysis of the transmission mechanism through which financial instability affects economic
activity.
Moreover, financial fragility is highly affected by macroeconomic policy, in particular fiscal
and monetary policies. The sharp decline of FIX in November 2008 and the cash crunch also
relate to these policies. We will discuss more details about the influence of policy on financial
fragility and economy in the following section.
4 Financial fragility, policy and economic activity
The global financial crisis and European sovereign debt crisis, which started in the external
markets, hit the Chinese economy with a decline in foreign demand for Chinese goods and
a drop-off in foreign direct investment (Morrison, 2012; Wong, 2011; Li et al., 2012; Wang et
al. 2010; Guo and N’Diaye, 2009; Mezo and Udavari, 2012). The capital outflows from China
and the loss of confidence hit the Chinese stock market, as well. Although the default loss
of the Chinese banking system directly due to subprime mortgages or European sovereign
debt was limited, there was a significant decline in banking repayment capacity (increase
of insolvency risk) due to the reduction of the banks’ capital. Thus it was likely that banks
would reduce lending in order to shore up their capital. Reductions in bank lending reduced
investment and lowered growth further. Indeed, the bank profitability subsequently declined
dramatically in 2008 and remained negative for a year.
However, deeper consideration should be given to the effect of the European debt crisis on
China. In a crisis situation, the developed countries deviated from free trade to protection-
ist measures, so as to fuel domestic demand. The European Union has increasingly focused
on China as a target of antidumping policies, particularly in the photovoltaic solar indus-
try, which contributed to the first default of corporate bonds in China as a result of a sharp
decrease of demand for targeted products.
In response to the financial instability that spread from western countries, e.g. the global
financial crisis, in November 2008 Chinese policymakers introduced a massive stimulus pro-
gram. This served as a major factor in persistent growth during the following two years,
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against the background of the global financial crisis.12 The new purchasing power was allo-
cated to public infrastructure, industries, and household consumption. On the supply side,
the additional investments contributed to capital accumulation as well as technological in-
novation, which acted as growth factors. Banks’ profits were improved as a result of their
involvement in industrial investment. Moreover, the substantial increase in equity growth
increased banks’ capital, lowering MPoU.
Overall, this series of fiscal and monetary policies has helped sustain a healthy pace of eco-
nomic growth in China, while much of the world fell into recession. Yet most of the stimulus
came not in the form of direct fiscal outlays but through an explosion in new lending (Borst,
2014).13 As a consequence of policies, huge amounts of capital were injected into the economy
through investment leading to overcapacity in some industries such as solar energy and real
estate, which gave rise to the first default of corporate bonds due to supply far outstripping
demand with the antidumping policies of the European Union and the real estate bubble in
China.
In order to remedy these side effects of policies, the central bank required banks to slow down
the growth rate of loans and to improve the overall quality of credit assets by tightening
monetary policy, along with enhancing risk prevention awareness.14 As a result, commercial
banks’ non-performing loans (NPLs) ratio in real estate decreased significantly, in spite of the
collapse of real estate.15,16 In the short-term, these remedial measures stabilized the financial
system after the turmoil in the real estate industry. However, it may prove problematic in the
12The stimulus program comprised an investment program, accommodativemonetary policies, tax cuts,
and easing of the burden on state-owned enterprises totaling RMB 4 trillion (US$ 586.68 billion).
13From 2008 to 2014, the amount of debt in China increased from around 7 trillion to 22 trillion. The
total credit to GDP grew from 120 percent to above 200 percent (Source: National Bureau of Statistics of
China and Bank for International Settlements).
14From January 2010 to June 2011, the PBoC raised the required reserve ratio 12 times, and benchmark
rates three times. See more detail in PBoC (2010a-d).
15The NPLs ratio serves as a proxy of ex-post quality for credit risk. The NPLs dropped to 1.26 percent
at the end of 2010, from 1.93 percent at the end of 2009 (CBRC, 2010).
16The banking system experienced high exposure to the real estate sector through direct or indirect
investment and real estate loans. Mei and Saunder (1995), He et al. (1996), Ghosh et al. (1997), Lu and
So (2005), and Li and Cao (2009) find a positive relationship between bank stock returns and real estate
stock returns in the US and some Asian countries, including mainland China. The influence of the real
estate market on bank stock returns might be that the unfavorable information about the real estate market
lowers the markets’ expectations regarding real estate, as well as the quality of banks’ asset holdings in
real estate. As a result, investors will ask for more risk compensation or will switch from banking stocks
to other holdings, and the bank stock price will therefore decrease (Ghosh et al. 1997; Lu and So, 2005).
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longer term. The excessive liquidity squeeze brought about the cash crunch in China. First,
the rigid reserve requirements could be one of the reasons for the banks’ low profitability, as
it reduced the amount of loans provided and subsequently the interest from loans. Second,
there exists a serious liquidity mismatch in China because banksmassively finance their long-
term asset holdings with short maturity liabilities (Chen et al., 2015; Borst, 2014). The reduced
money supply puts pressure on the finance of the long-term and medium-term loans, which
increases the insolvency risk. Moreover, the central bank’s restrictive monetary policy has
forced smaller enterprises, which cannot compete with the large state-owned companies in
obtaining loans from banks, to seek finance from shadow banks. The rapid credit growth
in the shadow banking system in China, which lacks oversight and market disclosure (IMF,
2013), has been one of the economy’s key vulnerabilities.
In summary, we claim that the global financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis, and the cash
crunch are fragile financial events in China based on our FIX. The instability comes from the
shocks to the real economy characterized by lower bank profitability and high insolvency
risk. The macroeconomic policies created in response to a recession or the overheating of the
economy successfully stabilized the economy in the short-term. However, in the long-term,
the effectiveness of these restrictive policies is doubtful, as is partly revealed by the first bond
default and cash crunch in China.
5 Conclusion
China has a significant and growing influence in the global economy, but few studies have
focused on China’s financial fragility. This paper proposes a FIX for the Chinese banking
sector using an aggregate weighting technique. The variables used for the construction of
the FIX include growth rate on banking equity index and MPoU, which are the proxies for
bank profitability and insolvency risk, respectively. We assigned the weights of two variables
on FIX based on the effects on real output by analyzing the impulse response functions and
variance decompositions of a VAR model.
We extend the existing literature on financial fragility in several ways. First, in choosing a
15
measurement of systemic insolvency risk, we resolve the problem faced by a banking sector
like that of China, which is dominated by a few banks, by way of substituting a multiple
measure for a joint measure of probability of default. Second, we incorporated the effect
of bank regulation, i.e. CAR, into the framework of the FIX by focusing on PoU instead of
PoD following Chan-Lau and Sy (2007). Our results show that the incorporation of CAR
is significant, especially during the tranquil periods of low asset volatility. In addition, we
provide not only the empirical analysis of the relationship between the financial fragility and
economic activity with VAR model, but also offer an economic rationale for the mechanism
through which financial instability affects economic cycles.
According to our FIX with its threshold, we have identified three relatively fragile episodes
during the five years: (1) the global financial crisis, (2) the European sovereign debt crisis,
and (3) the cash crunch in China, with slowdowns of the growth rate, accompanied by a
decrease of bank profitability and an increase of insolvency risk. Meanwhile, the Chinese
government implemented a series of macroeconomic policies to boost or stabilize the econ-
omy. The policies took effect promptly but brought about several side effects in the longer
term, such as overcapacity of industries, serious shadow banking risk and heavy dependence
on investment.
In future, instead of using asset correlation, which only captures linear dependence, we could
apply copula functions to characterize the whole dependence structure of default, i.e. linear
and non-linear dependence (Goodhart and Segoviano, 2009). Moreover, the study could be
further extended to investigate Hong Kong’s financial fragility because of its close interaction
and integration with mainland China. We could compare and contrast the financial fragility
of the two and see how they interact with each other.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Systemic insolvency risk
In Merton (1974), the following stochastic process describes the dynamics of value of assets
dV = µVdt+ sVVdW (3)
where V is the market value of the firm’s assets, µ is the continuously compounded expected
return on V, sV is the volatility of firm value and dW is a standard Wiener process.
It can be shown that
E = VN(d1)  Le rTN(d2) (4)
sE =
✓
V
E
◆
N (d1) sV (5)
d1 =
ln(VL ) + (r+
1
2s
2
V)T
sV
p
T
d2 = d1   sV
p
T
where r is the risk-free rate, and L is the debt level with time to maturity T.
From equations (4) and (5), we can calculate V and sV
V =
E+ Le rTN (d2)
N (d1)
sV =
E
N (d1)V
sE
PoD can be written by
PoD = Prob(ln(VT)  ln(L))
Since the value of assets follows the geometric Brownian motion of equation (3), the value of
the assets at time T is given by
ln (VT) = ln (V0) +
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T#T
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Therefore, we can rewrite PoD as follows:
PoD = N ( DD)
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In this paper, s2E is estimated for each month by the Exponential Weighted Moving Average
(EWMA), as proposed by J.P. Morgan (1996)
s2E,t = (1  q) (Rt   µ)2 + qs2E,t 1
where R is the monthly return of equity, and q is the decay factor, which is set equal to 0.97
for the monthly data.17 The initial value of s2E is set equal to the variance of the first 12
observations. Value of equity, E, is equal to the product of the outstanding number of shares
and stock prices.
We use the methodology proposed by Cathcart and El-Jahel (2004) to estimate multiple de-
fault probability with asset correlation, the probability that at least one bank in a portfolio
will fail. Consider the case of two banks, n = 2, where n is the number of banks. PoD (1\ 2)
is the probability that the two banks default at the same time
PoD (1\ 2) = Prob(ln(V1T)  ln(L1), ln(V2T)  ln(L2))
As the default probability of a single bank is assumed to follow a standard normal distribu-
tion, for the case of two banks, PoD (1\ 2) is equal to a standard bivariate normal density,
N2 ( DD1, DD2; r1,2)
DD1 and DD2 are given in the above calculations, and r1,2 is the pairwise correlation between
the assets of bank 1 and bank 2. The probability that at least one bank defaults, i.e. MPoD,
can be written by
17The EWMA method is a standard to estimate volatility. J.P. Morgan (1996) provides this model to
estimate time-varying variance and covariance. In that paper, the decay factor, q, is determined as 0.94 for
daily data and 0.97 for monthly data.
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MPoD (1[ 2) = PoD (1) + PoD (2)  PoD (1\ 2)
= N ( DD1) + N ( DD2)  N2 ( DD1, DD2; r1,2)
Consider the probability of at least one default in a portfolio of n   2:
MPoD (1[ · · · [ n) = Âni=1 PoD (i) Âi 6=j PoD (i \ j) +
· · ·+ ( 1)n 1 PoD (1\ · · · \ n)
PoD (1\ · · · \ k) = Nk
  DD1, · · · , DDk; ri,j 
where MPoU can be calculated in the same way as MPoD.
To calculate this probability, we need to know multivariate standard normal distribution. So
ri,j
⇣
= s2i,j(sisj)
 1
⌘
should be estimated, where s2i,j is the covariance between bank i and bank
j’s asset returns. si and sj are the volatilities of bank i and bank j’s asset returns. si and sj are
the same as the case of individual default. We also follow J.P. Morgan (1996) to estimate s2i,j
by EWMA:
s2i,j,t = (1  q) (Ri,t   µi)
 
Rj,t   µj
 
+ qs2i,j,t 1
where Ri and Rj are asset returns of bank i and bank j. The initial value of s2i,j is set equal to
the covariance of the first 12 observations.
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Appendix B. Data set details
• N&P: In China, some banks’ stocks are traded not only on the mainland but also
in Hong Kong. There are also some restricted shares on the mainland, which are
not traded within the market. However, they do have value. We follow Peng et al.
(2007) in estimating the price of restricted shares as equal to 58% of stock prices
on the mainland.
• D: We follow Vassalou and Xing (2004) in dealing with liability. We assume the
liability to be due in one year, i.e. T = 1. L is equal to short-term debt plus half of
long-term debt. As the balance sheet data is available annually at the end of the
year, monthly data is estimated using cubic splines interpolation. It is available
in three to four month lags compared to the equity price, so we use lagged four-
month debt data in our calculation. For example, the debt level we used for 31
May is the reported debt level on 31 January of the same year.
• Shanghai Interbank Offered Overnight Rate (SHIBOR): This is the first interest
rate to be largely liberalized in China, while deposit rates remain heavily con-
trolled by PBoC. Therefore we use SHIBOR as our risk-free rate, which is deter-
mined more by market forces than other interest rates. PBoC (2009b) has con-
firmed the function of SHIBOR as a benchmark rate in the money market. From
2007, all corporate bonds have been quoted with SHIBOR.
• IPI: The National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China publishes
the annual growth rate of real IPI.
• China’s 16 listed banks: see in Table 2.
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Appendix C. Figures and tables
Figure 1: Insolvency risk and bank profitability
In Figure 1(a), the blue line is MPoU (LHS) and the red line is MPoD (RHS). Figure
1(b) explains the quarter on quarter percentage change of the equity index of the Chi-
nese banking sector. The shaded areas show the recessionary periods according to the
OECD-based recession indicators for China offered by FRED.
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Figure 2: The effects of CAR and asset volatility
In Figure 2, The solid lines are the effect of CAR (LHS) and the dotted lines are the asset
volatility of 16 banks (RHS). The shaded areas show the recessionary periods according
to the OECD-based recession indicators for China offered by FRED.
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Figure 3: Financial fragility index
The solid line is the FIX and the dotted line is the threshold of FIX. The shaded areas
show the recessionary periods according to the OECD-based recession indicators for
China offered by FRED.
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Table 1: 16 listed banks in China
RANK BANK Start
1 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 10/31/2006
2 China Construction Bank 9/28/2007
3 Agricutural Bank of China 7/30/2010
4 Bank of China 7/31/2006
5 Bank of Communication 5/31/2007
6 China Merchants Bank 9/30/2005
7 Industrial Bank 2/28/2007
8 China Mingsheng Banking Corp 3/31/2006
9 Shanghai Pudong Development Bank of China 3/30/2007
10 China CITIC Bank 4/30/2007
11 China Everbright Bank 8/31/2010
12 Ping An Bank 9/30/2005
13 Hua Xia Bank 3/30/2007
14 Bank of Beijing 9/28/2007
15 Bank of Ningbo 7/31/2007
16 Bank of Nanjing 7/31/2007
Table 2: Description of dataset
Name Components Source
CMI Shares in all 16 banks listed on the mainland
Wind database
N&P Shares in mainland China, Hong Kong and under restriction
D Short-term debt plus half of long-term debt
R SHIBOR
RIR SHIBORminus expected inflation
IPI Output of manufacturing, mining and utilities National Bureau
CPI Relative cost of a basket of consumer goods and services of Statistics
PRP The average of commercial housing prices in China of China
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Table 3: Statistics of unit root tests
Variables ADF PP AO IO
IPI -3.444* -3.284* - -
Equity -2.362 -1.817 -4.473* -6.380*
MPoU -2.815 -3.264* -4.347* -4.283*
4IPI -9.321** -8.953** - -
4Equity -5.366** -8.214** - -
4MPoU -9.935** -11.543** - -
In the test equation, the intercept term is included and the trend term is not included.
“**” and “*” indicate that the null hypothesis that the variable has a unit root can be
rejected at the 1% and 5% significance level respectively.
Table 4: Impulse responses of VAR
Model Equity! IPI MPoU! IPI
{IPI, Equity, MPoU} + -
{IPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU} + -
{IPI, CPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU} + -
{IPI, PRP, CPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU} + -
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Appendix D. Supplementary information
Figure 4: IRFs of VAR model {IPI, Equity, MPoU}
The solid lines indicate the impulse responses of one standard deviation shock and the
dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5: IRFs of VAR model {IPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU}
The solid lines indicate the impulse responses of one standard deviation shock and the
dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 6: IRFs of VAR model {IPI, CPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU}
The solid lines indicate the impulse responses of one standard deviation shock and the
dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 7: IRFs of VAR model {IPI, PRP, CPI, RIR, Equity, MPoU}
The solid lines indicate the impulse responses of one standard deviation shock and the
dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 5: Variance decomposition of IPI with Equity andMPoU
Step IPI Equity MPoU
1 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 99.1918 0.8057 0.0025
3 97.5005 2.4872 0.0124
4 95.1469 4.7433 0.1098
5 92.3807 7.2361 0.3832
6 89.4369 9.6849 0.8782
7 86.5073 11.9056 1.5871
8 83.7297 13.8072 2.4631
9 81.1904 15.3673 3.4423
10 78.9331 16.6060 4.4609
11 76.9703 17.5640 5.4658
12 75.2939 18.2886 6.4175
13 73.8835 18.8261 7.2904
14 72.7122 19.2173 8.0705
15 71.7506 19.4967 8.7527
16 70.9697 19.6920 9.3383
17 70.3420 19.8252 9.8328
18 69.8423 19.9135 10.2442
19 69.4485 19.9698 10.5818
20 69.1411 20.0038 10.8552
21 68.9036 20.0226 11.0738
22 68.7219 20.0315 11.2466
23 68.5844 20.0341 11.3815
24 68.4814 20.0330 11.4856
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Table 6: Variance decomposition of IPI with RIR, Equity andMPoU
Step IPI RIR Equity MPoU
1 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 98.9803 0.2621 0.7412 0.0164
3 97.0553 0.5840 2.3012 0.0596
4 94.6253 0.8239 4.4051 0.1457
5 91.9967 0.9521 6.7561 0.2951
6 89.3691 0.9915 9.1135 0.5259
7 86.8600 0.9793 11.3114 0.8492
8 84.5330 0.9500 13.2502 1.2667
9 82.4193 0.9292 14.8813 1.7702
10 80.5304 0.9335 16.1922 2.3439
11 78.8664 0.9713 17.1956 2.9667
12 77.4198 1.0453 17.9198 3.6151
13 76.1785 1.1533 18.4026 4.2655
14 75.1270 1.2904 18.6866 4.8960
15 74.2476 1.4495 18.8150 5.4878
16 73.5209 1.6230 18.8297 6.0264
17 72.9274 1.8028 18.7687 6.5011
18 72.4470 1.9815 18.6653 6.9061
19 72.0607 2.1527 18.5471 7.2395
20 71.7504 2.3110 18.4355 7.5031
21 71.4996 2.4526 18.3461 7.7018
22 71.2937 2.5749 18.2889 7.8425
23 71.1203 2.6768 18.2689 7.9339
24 70.9694 2.7584 18.2867 7.9855
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Table 7: Variance decomposition of IPI with CPI, RIR, Equity andMPoU
Step IPI CPI RIR Equity MPoU
1 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 99.1068 0.0017 0.3676 0.4039 0.1199
3 97.6185 0.0022 0.8163 1.2241 0.3390
4 95.9031 0.0188 1.1646 2.2767 0.6369
5 94.1636 0.0762 1.3755 3.3794 1.0052
6 92.5005 0.1948 1.4732 4.3977 1.4338
7 90.9588 0.3853 1.4977 5.2522 1.9060
8 89.5564 0.6481 1.4857 5.9107 2.3991
9 88.2985 0.9749 1.4647 6.3747 2.8872
10 87.1837 1.3517 1.4520 6.6669 3.3457
11 86.2068 1.7615 1.4565 6.8212 3.7541
12 85.3598 2.1865 1.4805 6.8748 4.0984
13 84.6322 2.6103 1.5223 6.8635 4.3718
14 84.0118 3.0189 1.5772 6.8180 4.5741
15 83.4854 3.4015 1.6398 6.7623 4.7110
16 83.0392 3.7506 1.7046 6.7138 4.7918
17 82.6598 4.0618 1.7667 6.6830 4.8286
18 82.3348 4.3333 1.8226 6.6751 4.8341
19 82.0530 4.5658 1.8698 6.6909 4.8204
20 81.8049 4.7614 1.9071 6.7280 4.7986
21 81.5828 4.9233 1.9345 6.7820 4.7774
22 81.3805 5.0556 1.9528 6.8476 4.7636
23 81.1937 5.1623 1.9632 6.9194 4.7614
24 81.0193 5.2477 1.9674 6.9924 4.7732
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Table 8: Variance decomposition of IPI with PRP, CPI, RIR, Equity andMPoU
Step IPI PRP CPI RIR Equity MPoU
1 100.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2 99.1175 0.0114 0.0002 0.3863 0.3616 0.1230
3 97.6446 0.0303 0.0104 0.8508 1.1223 0.3416
4 95.9273 0.0499 0.0521 1.2041 2.1312 0.6354
5 94.1591 0.0654 0.1438 1.4112 3.2212 0.9994
6 92.4458 0.0748 0.2937 1.5008 4.2574 1.4275
7 90.8460 0.0786 0.4990 1.5173 5.1526 1.9064
8 89.3934 0.0786 0.7487 1.5005 5.8638 2.4150
9 88.1065 0.0774 1.0267 1.4788 6.3831 2.9275
10 86.9932 0.0781 1.3156 1.4694 6.7264 3.4173
11 86.0526 0.0833 1.5993 1.4801 6.9237 3.8610
12 85.2762 0.0951 1.8645 1.5118 7.0113 4.2410
13 84.6497 0.1151 2.1016 1.5608 7.0257 4.5471
14 84.1539 0.1438 2.3046 1.6210 7.0002 4.7765
15 83.7665 0.1815 2.4713 1.6857 6.9619 4.9332
16 83.4640 0.2273 2.6022 1.7484 6.9315 5.0267
17 83.2232 0.2801 2.7000 1.8041 6.9223 5.0703
18 83.0225 0.3383 2.7689 1.8492 6.9416 5.0794
19 82.8429 0.4003 2.8141 1.8821 6.9908 5.0698
20 82.6692 0.4640 2.8405 1.9028 7.0671 5.0564
21 82.4897 0.5276 2.8532 1.9127 7.1650 5.0517
22 82.2970 0.5896 2.8564 1.9144 7.2769 5.0657
23 82.0873 0.6485 2.8534 1.9109 7.3950 5.1049
24 81.8600 0.7031 2.847 1.9055 7.5118 5.1726
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